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ABSTRACT
This study addresses a principal issue associated with the small-scale mining industry in
South Africa, namely mineral rights. Firstly it defines a small-scale mine and its role in
the South African economy. It then examines the current mineral rights policy and the
conditions under which the current mineral rights policy could be reformed in order to
encourage the growth of the small-scale mining sector. Various models and proposals
have been examined in an attempt to suggest the most suitable policy in terms of
acquisition and distribution of mineral rights,
Acquisition of mineral rights remains one of the major obstacles facing small-scale
mining companies. The need to change the legal framework surrounding the acquisition
of mineral rights is clearly demonstrated in this project report. Simplification of the legal
framework would lead t easy access to mineral rights by both large-scale and small-scale,
South African and foreign mining companies and remove the traditional complexities
associated with the current South African mineral rights policy which tend to sterilise
mineral rights. These complexities include subdivision of mineral rights, potential lock-
up of mineral rights by private compani.s and individuals and the State. Analysis of
methods to rationalise the mineral rights policy have demonstrated that nationalisation
and exprcpriation of mineral rights are counter productive and can not be used as vehicles
for access to mineral rights.
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In order to strengthen the small-scale mining industry changes to the mineral rights have
been proposed. A model mineral rights policy framework has been designed to promote
small-scale mining. Introduction of a mineral fights tax, taking into consideration the
specifics of the South African mining industry, similar to that of Swaziland of 1958 is
proposed as one of the ways of discouraging the sterilisation of mineral rights. It
introduces a cost element in the locking up of mineral rights by private companies and
individuals. It is envisaged that when the cost of holding these mineral rights is greater
than the benefits of holding the mineral rights, mineral rights holders would relinquish
them thereby allowing access to these mineral rights to other interested parties. The
relinquished mineral rights should revert to the State, which in tum should allocate them
to qualified mining companies. Due considerations of the unique characteristics of the
South African min ,g industry need to be taken into account when designing any mineral
rights policy. Implementation of any such policy should therefore be done with the
consensus of the mining industry.
Access to State mineral rights is also considered vital. Whilst it is important to provide
the small-scale mining sector with access to mineral rights it is recognised that the
success of the sector depends many factors, mineral rights among others. A holistic
approach that take into all face!' of small-scale mining are included in the proposed
policy framework for the development of the small-scale mining industry in South
Africa.
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CHAPTERl
DEFINING SMALL-SCALE MINING
1.1 Introduction
South Africa, according to Stear (1994), has been the best place to mine in Africa, with
mineral deposits that have resulted in a higher historical return on investment for the
exploration dollar than anywhere else in the world. Due to the nature of the South African
geology large-scale operations emerged. Exploitation of the Witwatersrand system required
concentrated capital and technology that gave rise to the mining house. Although a
combination of high expectations for South African mineral projects and the development
of the "big mine" philosophy has resulted in exploration being focused on big mineral
deposits, data available show that small-scale mining (SSM) exists in South Africa, though
marginalised to an extent.
It i: estimated that of the 1454 regulated mines in South Africa, 1200 are small mines
(Weissenberg, 1996). In terms of employment and production, South Africa is essentially a
country characterised by large mining operations providing 87 per cent of the jobs in the
mining industry (Minerals Bureau, 19(5). There has been, however, a surge of interest in
SSM and this interest is ret1ected by the ongoing debate on a new minerals policy and in
particular the need to promote the SSM sector (Stear, 1994). This study therefore aims to
analyse the mineral rights situation in South Africa and the problems facing SSM
companies in accessing the mineral rights. Based on these results, :1 mineral rights policy
framework that should address the mineral rights problems has been formulated.
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1.2 Statement of Problems
Historically mining in mineral producing countries started from small deposits, with small-
scale companies forming the nucleus of their mining industries. It is from these humble and
often struggling beginnings that larger deposits are developed into significant mines and
successful mining companies evolve, In South Africa, however, it is said that there is little
scope for SSM or small exploration companies (Jourdan, 1995). This is attributed to the
fact that mineral rights in most of the rich mineralised areas belong to the big mining
companies and private individuals; making it difficult for SSM companies to access these
mineral rights. Under such circumstances, efforts by the Government and mining industry
(refer to Discussion Document on Mining and Mineral Policy for South Africa, 1995) have
been directed towards the formulation of a policy that provides SSM companies access to
mineral rights.
Besides the problems of accessing mineral rights, the other problems faced by the SSM
industry include issues of high environmental and rehabilitation costs, marketing and
financial constraints. Although these constraints are acknowledged in the research report,
the analysis of these constraints is beyond the scope of this research report.
1.3 Definitions
The definition of SSM is a subject of issue. There is no individual who is a custodian of
this definition. Most definitions of SSM are based on the scale of production of the mine or
on total number of employees. In spite of the frequent use of scale concepts, a globally
accepted definition of SSM does not exist (Noetstaller, 1987). Generally,
2
definitions are based on one or more of the criteria listed in Table 1.1 and exhibit distinct
differences as a result of scale of operation:
TABLE 1.1: CRITERION FOR MINE CLASSIFICATION
Criterion Generally Observed Quality for
Small-scale Mining Large-scale Mining
Mine output in tpa Small Large
Number of persons employed per unit of Large Small
output
Gross annual income of firm. Low High
Degree of mechanisation or capitalisation Low High i
i
Labour productivity Low High
Size of mining concession Small Large
Size of reserves Small/unknown large/well known
Continuity or intermittence of operation Frequently continuous
intermittent
Source: World Bank Technical Paper, Industries and Finance Seri-s (1987)
SSM differs from artisanal mining by virtue of its legislative and regulatory framework.
All the legislative and regulatory requirements that apply to LSM also apply to SSM. Table
1.2 provides a list of the distinctive differences between, artisanal, small and large-scale
mining operations.
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TABLE 1.2: DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARTISANAL, SMALL AND LARGE
MINES
Paramete •.5 Artisanal Small Large
Legal persona No Yes Yes
Regulated No Yes Yes
EMPR No Yes Yes
Workers <20 >20 >20
Automation No Yes Yes
Industrial minerals No Yes Yes
Sandi
Dimension Stone No Yes Yes
Source: Minerals and MIlling Policy Public Workshop (1996)
Jennings (1993:3) defined SSM as "labour intensive mining operations with low per capita
productivity, using basic technology resulting from small investment of capital". Thus, in
his view an artisanal mine employing hundreds of people would be considered small-scale,
The distinction made by Kambani and Noetstaller (1987) between artisanal and SSM is
based on the fact that artisanal operations are usually illegal while SSM enterprises are
formally registered entities, usually in the form of single proprietorship companies, co-
operatives or limited companies. SSM enterprises generally have basic management
structures, a hired labour-force and a minimum degree of mechanisation.
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A small number of employees may not be a relevant indication of the size (in terms of
production) of the mine since it could be related to a high degree of mechanisation on the
mine. This in tum may result in different labour productivity. EVen if measured as per unit
output, the number of persons employed is highly variable depending on the type of
operation and geological characteristics of the deposits. Gross annual income largely
depends on the unit value of the commodity produced. The minimum size of the mining
lease required to support a given scale of operation is influenced by type of the
mineralisation and the shape of the orebody, while the viability of the project depends on
the size of reserves as well as grade of the are. Continuity or intermittence of mining
operation may be caused by factors other than seasonal employment in the other sectors of
the economy, e.g, climatic aspects or market forces.
Noestaller (1987) advocates final output in tonnes as the only acceptable measure for
delineation of the scale of an operation in the mining industry. He concludes that the
criteria listed in Table 1.1, are suitable only as additional indicators and for orientation
purposes in defining the size of a mine. Other various definitions have been used to
distinguish SSM from the other categories. One example is the definition based on the
annual production in tonnes per year run of mine (tpy r.o.m.) ore as suggested by
Noetstaller (1987) and shown in Table1.3 below.
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TABLE 1.3: CLASSIF[CATION OF MINE STATUS USING ANNUAL
PRODUCTION (TONNES PER ANNUM RUN OF MINE ORE)
Small Scale Mining (t/a)
below 50000
below 50000
below 100000
below 100000
below 100000
below 100000
from 20000 to 200000
below 150000
below 50000
below 60000
Source: World Bank (1987)
Large Scale Mining (t/a) I Source
-----
50000 to 500000
100000 to 1000000
50000 to 1000000
'nited Nations, 1972
(otschwar, 1986
Carmine, 1985
Leading, 1983
De Bored, 1983 and
Mikutowitcz, 1981
U.S.B.M., 1983
Ingler, 1983
Mining
1986 and
Magazine,
previous
years
Famandez, 1983
del Castillo, 1980
The Minerals Bureau has given its own definition of the SSM (Table 1.4), based on the
number of people employed in the operation. A total number of 50-99 employees would
signify a small-scale operation. This number is the same for all nine commodities studied.
The problem with this definition is that it disregards the actual size and output of the mine
mechanisation.
and ignores the relationship between number of employees and size of mine in the ease of
6
TABLE 1.4 : SSM ACTIVITIES, 1993: ACCORDING TO EMPLOYMENT
Mineral Category of Employment Total Total
Small Mine Employment Mines
Gold Artisanal 1-5 7 2
Micro-scale 6-20 0 0
Very small-scale 21-49 23 1
Small-scale 50-99 344 4
Diamonds Artisanal 1-5 15 6
Micro-scale 6-20 88 7
Very small-scale 21-49 324 10
Small-scale 50-99 443 7
Semi.- Artisanal 1-5 31 11
precious Micro-scale 6-20 40 3
Very small-scale 21-49 25 1
Small-scale 50-99 0 0
Brickclay Artisanal 1-5 18 9
Micro-scale 6-20 109 10
Very small-scale 21-49 34 1
Small-scale 50-99 132 2
Aggregate Artisanal 1-5 46 13
Micro-scale 6-20 344 28
Very small-scale 21-49- 1622 52
Small-scale 50-99 944 15
Sandworks Artisanal 1-5 180 64
Micro-scale 6-20 427 40
Very small-scale 21-49 565 17
Small-scale 50-99 358 6
Coal Artisanal 1-5 0 0
Micro-scale 6-20 11 1
Very small-scale 21-49 177 5
Small-scale 50-99 309 4
Slate Artisanal 1-5 0 0
Micro-scale 6-20 0 0
Very small-scale 21-49 25 1
Small-scale 50-99 123 2
Salt Artisanal 1-5 55 19
Micro-scale 6-20 340 37
Very small-scale 21-49 291 12
Small-scale 50-99 249 5
Minerals Bureau, 1995 (Unpublished)
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There seem to be considerable variations in defining the size of a SSM. There is, however,
general agreement that ~.SSM could be approximated to have an output of between 50,000
tonnes and 100,000 tonnes per year run of mine ore usually exploiting high value, low
volume minerals such as ~old and gemstones. The number of people employed in a SSM
company are estimated to be at least 20. Based on the information given in Tables 1.2 and
1.3 it is considered that a small-scale mine is registered as a company and regulated by the
laws that governs the operations of a mining company. This means the small mine is
required to draw up an Environmental Management Programme Report and its operations
are run under a qualified mine manager.
Most researchers who have attempted to define SSM have suggested a definition of a SSM
as a mine with production between 50 000 tonnes per annum and 100 000 tonnes per
annum. The preferred definition of a SSM gives a guideline for distinguishing between the
various forms of mining as it impossible to give an exact definition of SSM in terms of
production capacity and employment levels. The report therefore assume any mine with
production lower than 100 000 tonnes per annum, regulated by the Companies Act and
laws that govern mining companies and have at least 20 people employed, to be SSM.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF THE SSM INDUSTRY
2.1 Introduction
Several researchers have highlighted the role of the SSM industry and its relationship to the
national economy. Noetstaller's (1987) analysis of mines with an annual production of less
than 100,000 tons indicates that small mines contribute 16% to the global output of non-
fuel minerals. In terms of gross value, this is equivalent to US$21.6 billion in 1982 dollars.
In 1979, China produced 635 Mt of coal of which 43.7% came from some 20,000 small
mines. In 1983, the SSM sector produced 49.2% of total coal produced in China. In the
United States of America, small mines produce about 20% of the total coal output of 700
Mt (Noetstaller, 1987).
The main objective of SSM is
employment, foster economic
t a profit. Secondary objectives are to create
al development and achieve an optimal utilisation of
mineral resources, It is considered mat where the assessed potential of SSM, such as wealth
creation, employment, economic and rural development, outweigh its negative
characteristics (e.g. environmentai damage, poor health and working standards) the
government should assist in setting up the small scale operations. According to Jennings
(1993), of the 30 million or so mineworkers throughout the world, it is reasonable to
assume that at least 6 million are engaged in SSM in developing countries. The levels of
employment in SSM in various countries are listed in Table 2.1. It is estimated that China
has about 3 million people employed in small-scale coal mines. Estimates of employment
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in the sector vary and are difficult to quantify because the numbers normally include the
artisanal miners (World Bank, 1992).
TABLE 2.1: SSM EMPLOYMENT IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES
Country Empluyment Reference
China 3,000,000 Jennings, 1993
Brazil 1,000,00() SMI,1990
India 500,000 SMI,1989
Indonesia 465,000 ILO,1990
1ihiliPl)ines 200,000 ILO,1990
Zaire 150,000 ILO,1990
;,'T:!lzania 100,000 Kambani and
Noetstaller,1994
"'Mali -100,000 World Bank, 1992
;c .....
Sierra Leone 100,000 World Bank, 1992
South Africa 79,3~8 Minerals Bureau 1995
Burkina Faso
.-
60,000 World Bank, 1992
Ghana 30,OUO World Bank, 1992
Guinea 30,000 I World Bank, 1992
Zimbabwe 30,000 --- ';W~rid Bank, 1992
Peru 20,000 ILO.1990
World Total >6,000,000 Jennings, 1993
Adapted from Kambani and Noetstaller, 1994
2.2 The Role of the SSM Industry: A Case of Ghana
In Ghana all mineral rights belong to the State and the thriving SSM points to the success
that have been made by the SSM sector in contributing to the economy of the country. This
case study illustrates two important factors. Firstly, that the SS:'/1 sector could play a
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significant role if it is given access to mineral rights. Secondly, that even in a situation
where mineral rights are State owned, with the proper policy framework, the SSM sector's
contribution to the economy of a country may be enormous.
SS\1 operations normally extract high-value and low-volume minerals like gold and
gemstones. These precious minerals are luxury goods, for which there is a limited market
in developing countries for the fin-ll gold jewellery or polished stones. SSM is therefore an
export-oriented economic activity, contributing significantly to the foreign exchange
earnings of developing countries (Kambani and Noetstaller, 1987).
The contribution nade by the small-scale sector in Ghana provides an insight into the value
of the SSM sector to a developing economy. From 1989 to 1995 SSM sector gold
production grew 14 fold; from 2 per cent in 1988, to 8 per cent of total gold production in
1995. During the same period, 1988-1995, large scale gold mining production grew only 4
times as shown in Table 2.2 and Figure 1. SSM and medium-scale mining (MSM) diamond
production has been on the declined since 1991. Overall, small and medium sized mines
produced more diamonds than the LSMs during the same period.
The gold and diamond and gold production figures in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 could have been
substantially higher had all the output smuggled out of the country taken into account. The
production data for both gold and diamonds in Ghana are therefore a misrepresentation of
facts because they are aggregated and do not distinguish between SSM and artisanal
mining. However, in the absence of data distinguishing the SSM from artisanal mining, the
data could be taken to be fair approximation of the activities of SSM.
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TABLE 2.2: GHANA GOLD PRODUCTION
Small-Scale Gold Mines Total Gold Production
Year Fine Ounces KgAu kg Au% Fine Ounces Au
!
kg Au production
Au contribution
1989 9272.00 288.39 2.16 429475$>1 13358.19
1990 19234.00 598.24 3,55 541401:1.33 16839,68
1991 8493,00 264.16 ],00 845907,85 26310,68
1992 10866,16 337.97 ],09 998194,50 31047,32
1993 33646.59 1046,53 2.67 126124,26 39234,68
1994 89520.44 2784.40 6,26 1430844.76 44504.25 I
1995 128533,96 3997,85 7.53 1706228,68 53069.65
Source: Mining Commission-Ghana (1996)
FIGURE 1: GOLI) PRODUCTION IN GHANA
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TABLE 2.3: DIAMONDS PRODUCTION IN CARATS
Year Small and Medium Diamond Mines Total Diamond Production
Carats % Contribution Carats
1989 151606,00 53.08 285636.00
1990 484876.00 76.18 636503.00
1991 541849.00 84.96 637736.00
1992 442266.00 67.37 656421.31
1993 37639955 63.70 590 (141.65
1994 405829.70 53.54 757991.41
1995 337456.94 53.45 631338.46
Source: Mining Commission-Ghana (1996)
FIGURE 2: DIAMOND PRODUCTION IN GHANA
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2.3 The Role of the SSM Industry in South Africa
A comparison of the economic contribution of the SSM and LSM to the mineral industry in
South Africa has been documented by the Minerals Bureau of South Africa and the data
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relating to employment, sales and production is shown in Table 2.4. The Minerals Bureau
of South Africa reported that in 1994 the SSM employed 13 percent of the approximately
600 000 workers in the mining industry. This indicated that some 80 000 workers were in
SSM employment. In 1994 the mining industry employed some 610 294 workers. Of R45
billion of mineral sales in 1991, the SSM sector contributed R6 billion. In that same year,
almost all aggregate and limestone produced in South Africa came from the SSM sector.
With an official unemployment rate of 37 per cent, it is argued that South Africa needs to
promote small and medium-size enterprises through state intervention in order to create
jobs and reduce poverty and unemployment amongst its people. Poverty and inequality
flow from unemployment and aggregate unemployment is increasing, although the growth
of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has improved impressively since 1992. Real GDP
increased from -3 per cent in 1992 to 3 per cent III 1996 (Quarterly Bulletin, 1997). In
order to reduce the aggregate unemployment, given the growth in population the Financial
Mail (1996) estimates that the real CDP growth has to exceed 8 per cent a year.
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TABLE 2.4: CONTRIBUTIONS TO MINERALS PRODUCTION, MINERAL SALES
AND EMPLOYMENT BY THE SMALL- AND LARGE-SCALE MINING SECTORS
Small-scale contribution Large-scale mining
contribution
PRODUCTION %
Aggregate 100% -
;1 •
100%I LImestone -
Diamonds 14% 86%
Gold 2% 98%
Sales Vahle (R bil) R6 R39
Employment 79338 530956
- "'
Sources: Minerals Bureau, 1992, 1995
The goal of the Government as set out in the white paper on small business promotion is to
redistribute wealth and empower black people economically, particularly the previously
disadvantaged groups such as women. According to Jourdan (1996), the expansion of the
minerals sector, which accounts for about three-fourths of South Africa's exports, is
essential to the government's reconstruction and development programme (RDP). The
creation of wealth could furthermore assist in reducing levels of violence that could
potentially destabilise the economy of South Africa.
Due to their lower overheads and fixed costs, SSM companies are able to mine deposits of
smaller size and hioher grades profitably, where LSM is not possible. It is therefore
possible to conclude that SSM companies would be better suited to succeed in exploiting
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profitably those deposits that would be marginal to LSM companies. SSM companies are
also better suited to the expeditious development of new deposits than large mining
companies, because the high levels of entrepreneurship and innovation found in small
companies often lead to innovative and inventive reasoning.
The creation of a vibrant SSM sector in South Africa would convert some of the ore-
deposits that exist only as potential resources at the level of large-scale operations into
exploitable reserves at the scale of a small operation. In addition, the creation of the small
mining operations would enhance the spirit of entrepreneurship in the country as well a,
provide opportunities for the surplus-trained manpower that often arises from
retrenchments during the depressed portions of economic cycles. The creation of a vibrant
SStv. sector could also help in eliminating the problem of artisanal mining. The World
Bank recognised the problems of artisanal mining in Africa as a fact of life and made
various recommendations to manage this situation. It recommended that:
"In some countries, artisanal mines are permitted under the mining law but
generally such miners have few rights and can be displaced by commercial mines.
In many countries, they are simply illegal. In most cases, the illegality is a rational
response to poorly formulated legislation, inadequate enforcement, and economic
distortions.
The challenge is to successfully modify these factors and provide incentives so
that artisanal mining will be encouraged, become regularised, grow and produce
more revenue for both miners and government. The two essential issues are the
legal rights to mine and satisfactory marketing arrangements.
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Regulations for environment and safety in this sector should be realistic. The
government should attempt to create an administrative presence in the mining
areas to control the worst aspects of artisanal activity, especially those regarding
safety, health and the environment, and provide some basic services and technical
assistance" (Engineering and Mining Journal, October 1992: 40).
Artisanal mining is not only limited to the other countries of Africa and Latin America but
is also rampant in South Africa. Examples o, artisanal mining in South Africa are the
Osizweni and Magdaleni coal mining operations in KwaZulu-Natal shown in Figures 3 and
4. The DME estimates the total number of people employed as artisanal miners to be 7500.
Diamond and gold seem to be minerals most favoured, followed by coal and clay, clay and
sand.
At the subsistence level poverty is the driving force behind efforts to enter mining.
Circumstances and a basic need to provide for themselves and their families drive miners at
this level. Clearly this situation differs, for example, from that of an established SSM
company or LSM company which invests in a mine as part of its business strategy, i.e. the
reason for considering an investment is motivated by reasons other than poverty.
It should be understood therefore that the intention is not to promote subsistence and
artisanal mining. Rather, it is that the government must consider ways and means to
encourage SSM and enhance opportunities through technical and financial support and
access to mineral rights, whilst also maintaining safety, health and environmental
standards.
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FIGURE 3: ARTISANAL COAL MINING AT OSIZWENI, KWAZULU NATAL
FIGURE 4: ARTISANAL COAL MINING AT MAGDALENI, KWAZULUNATAL
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FIGURE 4: ARTISANAL COAL MINING AT ANAND ALE, KWAZULU
NATAL
2.3.1 Case Study: Maranda Milling Company
Small and medium-scale mining are capable of making substantial contribution to national
and provincial economies. An example of this is the Maranda Mine, which produces
copper and is situated 53 km from Tzaneen the nearest big population centre. The mine
employs mainly local people except for the technical positions that are sourced elsewhere.
Out of the 520 people employed by the company, 500 are locals.
It is estimated that each mineworker in South Africa supports between 7 and 11
dependants (Minerals and Energy Policy Centre, 1996). Assuming an average of 11
dependants per mineworker, it may be argued that 6240 (worker plus 11 dependants)
livelihoods are dependent on the incomes from Maranda Mine. The mine provides
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employment in this remote, rural area, and is the only means of livelihood for the
community in the immediate vicinity.
Assuming an indirect national rate of job dependency with a multiplier effect of 2.3, as
given by Solomon (1996), the total livelihoods indirectly dependent on Maranda Mine is
1196. Altogether, this means a conservative 7436 livelihoods are dependent on the salaries
and wages from Maranda Mine.
2.3.2 Mining and Labour
Downscaling of the mining industry is a source of great concern to the government and
industry. The Minerals and Energy Policy Centre (MEPC) , in its presentation to the
Mineral and Mining Policy Workshop (1996), points out that downscaling primarily affects
the gold and diamond sectors. Table 2.4 and Figure 3 illustrate the downscaling the gold
mining industry has been going through. From 1993 to 2000 the gold industry is expected
to retrench about 129 000 workers.
If the retrenched workers were to be absorbed in other sectors of the economy, retooling
the retrenched workers with new skills would be required. Poor levels of education of these
retrenchees are likely to inhibit retraining at an acceptable rate. A SSM industry would
provide employment for many people, whether as owner-operator of an artisanal mine, Or
owner of or labourer in an entrepreneurial one and lessen the financial burden of retraining
and retrenchments in the mining industry.
Low commodity prices and poor labour productivity are the major causes of downscaling
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in the mining industry. Philip (1996) points out that the scale of job losses is undermining
the strategy for growth and development by government, making this a crisis of national
proportion.
The SSM industry, though vital for the economy, should not be seen as a panacea for the
retrenchments in the mining industry. It should therefore be viewed as a source of (limited)
employment opportunity for some of the retrenched workers. The long-term solution to
downscaling should lie in alternative growth strategies to replace mining's declining
contrib .ition to the economy.
TABLE 2:5: EMPLOYMENT LEVELS ON SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES (000)
COUNTRY OF 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 )1
ORIGIN
South Africa 226 273 265 246 224 194 171
Lesotho 104 106 101 101 98 88 84
Mozambique 56 46 44 43 43 42 42
Botswana 19 18 17 16 15 13 11
Swaziland 14 16 16 17 16 16 15
Malawi 18 18 13 2 0 0 0
Total Foreign 211 204 191 179 172 159 152
Total Workers 4'1'7 477 456 425 396 353 323
Source: Minerals Bureau of South Africa, 1993
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TABLE: 2.6PROJECTED RETRENCHMENTS (000):1993-2000
COUNTRY OF 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ORIGIN
South Africa 156 142 130 119 109 99 91 83
Lesotho 78 73 68 03 59 54 51 47
Mozambique 39 36 34 .n 29 27 25 24
Botswana 10 10 9 8 8 7 7 6
Swaziland 14 13 12 11 10 10 9 8
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Foreign 141 132 122 114 106 99 92 85
Total Workers 22 22 21 18 16 16 14
Retrenched
Progressive 22 43 62 80 96 112 126
Retrenchments
Source: Minerals Bureau, 1993
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2.4 Conclusion
SSM plays a vital role in the economies of mineral rich developing countries. Several
researchers have highlighted the role of the SSM sector and its relationship to the national
economies. The objectives of SSM are similar those of MSM and LSM in that all aim to
earn a profit from their operations. This fact differentiates the SSM, MSM and LSM
sectors from artisanal mining, which is subsistence in nature.
Compared to LSM the SMM industry plays a lesser role in the economy of South Africa,
In China 40 per cent of the coal produced is produced by the SSM sector. Assuming the
SSM sector in South Africa produces 13 per cent of the total 57 000 million tonnes coal
produced in 1~97. Suppose the SSM sector production is increased by 50 per cent, the
sector contribution to total coal produced will only increase to 19.5 per cent. In order for
the South African SSM coal mining to reach the magnitude of the contributions similar to
those in China the sector has to grow two fold. T1e analogue above shows that the LSM
sector is likely to remain the main source of coal in South Africa. However, the SSM sector
as shown in the case of Maranda Mine, has an important role in the economy of a
developing country such as South Afriea.
Although the SSM sector can help in absorbing some of the retrenched mine workers, there
is need to take cognisance of the fact that the long term solution to the retrenchment of
workers should be in retooling them with new skills that would enable them to work in
other sectors of the economy. As discussed above, it is impossible for the SSM mining
industry to absorb all those retrenched from within the mining industry. Hence, in
promoting SSM it is equally important to look at ways of promoting MSM and LSM.
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CHAPTER 3
SOUTH AFRICAN MINERAL RIGHTS
3.1 Introduction
Ownership of mineral rights in South Africa is dual (mixed), with the State exercising total
control, as indicated by map 4, over approximately more than 70 per Cent (If the land area
(van Rooyen, 1993). The State also controls the mineral rights underlying the continental
shelf. Where the State exercises partial control in the case of the former self-governing
territories, mineral rights and land rights have been separated. In this case, the State holds
the mineral right in trust for a community 01' a "ibe, e.g. Lebowa Mineral Trust. The
mineral rights can therefore be categorised in four classes:
(i) Mineral rights with respect of tribal land and owned by the state or tribes;
(ii) mineral rights owned by the State;
(iii) Mineral rights owned by the surface owners, i.e. no separation has taken
place, e.g, farmers, and
(iv) Mineral rights owned by holder/s other than the surface owner. This
includes mining companies anti deceased estates.
The distribution of mineral rights and mineral right holdings by companies is shown in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. These holdings represent about 27.7 pel' cent of South
Africa's surface area (Van Rooyen, 1993). Table 4.2 shows (he majority of company
mineral rights holdings being I :d by the Transvaal Consolidated Lands and Exploration
Company and Anglo American Corporation. The distribution of mineral rights shown in
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the Tables 4.1 and 4.2 could only be used as a guide to the ownership distribution of
mineral rights. This is because the Department of Minerals and Energy by its own
admissic " does not know the full exter of its holdings of state owned mineral rights.
According to the South African common law, the owner of land is also the owner of the
space above the land as well as the owner of the minerals in the land. This fundamental
principle is expressed in the maxim, cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum at ad inferos
l(Badenhorst et at, 1994). In Illwll Government v Marais and Others 1920 AD 240 at 240,
Innes CJ stated the common law principle as follows:
"The principle is fundamental that the owner of the land is owner not only of the
surface but of everything legally adherent thereto, and also of everything contained
in the soil below the surface"
1 Guilts est solum eius est usque ad cae/IIIII et usque ad illfa/'os • the owner of the land Is also the owner of the
space above and below the surface of the land (Accursius - 13 century ltallun Commentator)
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TABLE 3.1: DISTRIBUTION OF STATE OWNED MINERAL RIGHTS
Areas to which State owned mineral rights are apportioned Area as a % of total urea of
RSA
Former Self-Governing States (all minerals) 15.4
Cape Province Excluding Former Self-Governing States 46,2
(Gold, Silver, Precious Stones)
KwaZulu Natal Excluding Former Self-Governing States 4,7
(Precious Metals, Precious Stones)
Kruger National Park 1,6
Alienated State Land (mostly all minerals) i.d.
72.3
Private Sector (companies and individuals) 27,7
TOTAL 100
Source; Van Rooyen, 1993
TABLE 3,2: MINERAL RIGHTS HOLDINGS BY COMPANIES IN RAND VALUE
AND BY AREA
Group Mineral Rights Holdings R(M) Estimated %nftotol
Hectares
Transvaal Conslldated Lands and Exploration Company 748.4 1871 aDO 56.78 ,-
Anglo American Corporation 212 540 000 16.39
Amgold
De Beers Centenary 32 82000 2.49
Gencor 26 67 DOD 2,03
Gold Fields (1) 57 146000 4.43
JCI 126 323000 9,80
Anglovaal 44 112000 3.40
60 154 000 4,67
Note 1, ActUnl 1305.4 3295 000 100
-_
'.' -
Source' Van Rooyen, 1993
26
I
~
E:5
U)
~
U)~
~
~
E-i
U)
~
9
~en
~
U
Z
0u
§
~
~
d......
~en
3
Pol
\Q
~
CJ
ti::
\\
\\" \'t-J
I
I
~
\
\
~
\
I
I
I
I
I
/
/...
3.~ Principal Rights ofMineral Right Holder
The holder of the mineral rights is entitled to go upon the property and search for minerals
and if he finds any, to sever them and carry them away, subject always to the relevant
statutory provisions. The mineral right can be equated to the property right. In essence, the
property right is the right of ownership in a thing and the thing to which this right relates
(Silberburg and Schoemann, 1987). Mineral rights are therefore rights in property in which
the state's constitutional role is to protect rights in property. The limitations or conditioning
factors would be rights to expropriate for public interest etc., but the state does not have a
constitutional role to distribute property rights. It is argued by proponents of change to the
current system that the state has a tole to redress historical injustices through redistribution
of unjustly acquired property.
3.3 Separation of Mineral Right Holding from Land Ownership
The first legislative evidence that rights to minerals could be held separately from
owne=hip in l=td is to be found in a resolution of the Volkstraad of the South African
kepub'Ic c·ited 8 November 1881 (Viljoen H. P and Bosman P. H., 1979). This resolution
require 1mineral rights sales to be registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds. Further
evidence that rights to minerals could be held apart from the ownership in land is to be
found in the sections 30 and 32 of the Registration of JJeeds and Titles Act 25 of 1909 and
the Deeds Registries Act 13 of 1918.
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Upon severance from the ownership of land, a mineral right is created and such right is
held under a separate title. These mineral rights are real rights in property. A real right is a
right against third parties so that the owner of the right can sue anyone for it. These rights
afford good security and continuity of tenure allows prospecting or mining or to grant
others these rights, permit transfer and marketing in rights to prospect and mineral rights.
The South African mineral rights system evolved since 1813 into a very complex system
(Kruger et at, ~991). Although according to Roman-Dutch Law ownership of land includes
the SUE ice and the subsurface (minerals), mineral rights over the years have been severed
by means of a certificate of mineral rights, most of which have been acquired by
individuals and companies. In many cases mineral rights have been subdivided through
laws of inheritance and Jourdan (1993) notes that, as a consequence, the mineral rights on a
given farm were held by more than 150 people. This kind of a situation discourages new
entrants in the industry, particularly small-scale operators
3.3.1 Kruger et al (1991) in a case of the Yergenoeg Fluorite Mille Problems arising
from subdivision of mineral rights
The case of Trojan Exploration Company v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Limited (S. A. (4),
1996) also demonstrates the complexities caused by the sub-division of mineral rights. Not
only does this case highlights specific problems associated with the subdivision of mineral
rights, but also highlights problems associated with the access to mineral rights. These
include among others the non-availability of information and locking up of mineral rights
by the owners.
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3.3.2 SUb-division of Mineral Rights: The Case of the Yergenoeg Fluorite Mine
Kruger et at (1991) in the discussion entitled "Equitable distribution and efficient use of
mineral rights: the case of South African Minerals Corporation" examined the complexity
caused by the sub-division of mineral rights of the Vergenoeg Fluorite Mine. Fluorite is the
principal economic mineral and is associated with haematite. The deposit is located on
farms Kromdraai 209JR and Naauwpoort 20BJR with the Vergenoeg Fluorite mine situated
at Kromdraai 209JR. Lourens Jacobus Erasmus and his wife Helletje Maria Erasmus under
the I '..;ed of Transfer T611/1876, in the Pretoria Deed Office originally held the mineral
rights of the farm 209JR together with a freehold.
The farm Krorndraai now comprises of portions RE, RE2, 3, 4, 5 and 11; and portions
RE1, 6, 7,8,9 and 10 are consolidated with Rust der Winter 180 JR. The subdivision of
the latter portions into numerous agricultural holdings has therefore redefined the cadastral
boundaries (dotted lines in Figure 7). Kruger et al (1991) concluded that this would
complicate the choice of possible future exploration targets for fluorite and other minerals.
During the yeats since 1929, the mineral rights have undergone several sub-divisions.
Consequently, a total of 288 individuals have shares in the mineral rights fractions that
r, 'ietween 3.5 to 0.00005 per cent of the original portions of Kromdraai, A further
complication is that rights to iron have been severed from the rest of the mineral rights.
Acquiring mineral rights or prospecting lease agreements on such a property, which is
necessary before prospecting can begin, would involve tracing each of these mineral-right
holders. The difficulty of accessing the mineral rights will therefore delay the final
acquisition of these rights. This case highlights the difficulties that a SSM company (LSM
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companies would be well equipped with the legal expertise and the financial means) would
face in order to access these mineral rights.
3.3.3 Case Study: Transvaal Consolidated Lantis anti Exploration Company (TCL)
Kruger et al (1991) also gives an example of the complex nature of mineral rights in South
Africa as exemplified by sterilisation of mineral rights held by the Transvaal Consolidated
Lands and Exploration Company (TeL). TCL acquired large tracts of land for the
exploration and pre-emption of mineral rights. This company holds land in the Rustenburg,
Waterburg, Middleburg and Lydenburg districts covering a total of 1.871 million hectares.
Kruger et al (1991) concluded that the mineral rights held by TCL, except Rand Mines, are
effectively sterilised. Although TCL does not have the staff to effectively prospect its vast
holding, any negotiation with the company tor prospecting is usually protracted, frustrating
and futile.
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Fugure 6: Kromdraai 209 JR showing the complex subdivision.
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3.3.4 In the case of Trojan Exploration Company v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Limited
1996 (4) SA 499 AD.
The Appellate Division (A.D.), for the first time in South Africa, stipulates that co-
ownership of mineral rights is legal in the Republic of South Africa. The main issue in this
case is whether the respondents (Rustenburg Platinum Mines Limited (Rusplats), who have
acquired the rights to the precious metals in a certain area vested, were entitled to extract
and sell their precious metals as well as their" by-products" - which were base metals.»
and of which such base metal rights existed in the appellant (Trojan Exploration). Briefly,
Trojan Exploration was the holder of all the minerals in the Umokoanesstad area, except
for precious metals only. Pyramid Platinum Ltd. (second appellant) was the registered
holder of the mineral rights in respect of which Trojan had the prospecting contract.
Congruously, Rustenburg Platinum Mines was the registered holder of the rights to
precious metals. It's subsidiary, Lebowa Platinum Mines Ltd (Leplats), had the mining title
in respect of precious metals by virtue of a registered mining lease as defined in Sl of the
Mineral Right Act 20 c~ 1967.
It was common cause between the parties that the ores mined by Leplats contained a
mixture of precious metals and base minerals in a variety of combinations such that it was
impossible to mine one group without at the same time mining the other. This was the root
of the problem. Trojan in 1989 demanded that Leplats refrain from mining anything other
than precious metals. The are raised by Lebowa from Umokoanesstad was then
indiscriminately mixed with ore from mining anything other than precious metals. The
precious metal as well as base metals was then sold.
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The Trial Court: The Court a quo (court of first instance) allowed Rustenburg Mine to
mine payable ore despite it containing base metals arx minerals, that were held by another,
and to retain these base metals and minerals as their own and sell them for their own
account. The appellant thus lost all their rights to what was contemned in such ore because
it contained precious metals worth mining for.
The Armellate Division£: The A.D. overruled the trial court in a majorit
Schutz, J. A., with Botha, J. A. and Nestadt ,J. A. concurring. Plewman, A. J. J'
Heerden, J. A. concurred in the minority judgement. The majority adjudicated tL,
and Pyramid were the co-owners of the ore mined by Lebowa and Rustenburg Mines - bu.
the normal consequences of co-ownership were not necessarily applicable. Hence Lebowa
and Rustenburg were not entitled to appropriate base metals or minerals derived
from such ore and sell for tueir own account without due consideration of the
appellant's rights in respect of such ore.
The decision was based on the following reasoning:
Firstly, upon analysing the definitions of 'base metals' and 'precious rnetais' in the original
1908 Gold Act and 1934 Amendment,: the Trial Court erred upon their interpretation, as
there was no suggestion that base h.etals was a precious metal nor that where combination
ore was worked, that the holder of precious metals has a better right than the base metal
ones;
Secondly, it was incumbent on Rustplats to prove an implied term to the effect that in the
course of acquiring the precious metal rights it had succeeded also in confiscating base
metals;
2 The Appellate Division . the Supreme Court
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Thirdly, the right tc mine one mineral did not authorise the taking of another with which it
was found in association (see Geduld Property Mines Ltd. v New Springs Collierie:o.Ltd.
1934 TPD 104; Rogers v Brenton (1847) 10 QB 26). Hence, Rusplats were entitled in the.
course of their mining of precious metals in a reasonable manner, to extract all Ore also
containing base metals and minerals later separated for themselves;
Fourthly, when the mineral rights were reserved in 1925 and split in 1966, the latter date
did not create the right, but merely the division of an existing rights; and
Fifthly, the main question of who was entitled to the right has several theoretical
possibilities of (a) being some sort of co-ownership, (b) ajus re aliena (a right in the thing
of being alienated), (c) a right sui generis (a right which is a class of its own), (d) a
personal right (a right that exists only between individuals), (e) unjust enrichment (a claim
based on the principles of fairness and justice), (f) exclusive ownership on the part of the
mineral rights holder who severs it [the Court a quo chose I.f)).
The A. D. held that the object of each part was to use his own right for profit and should
not harm his neighbour - for each part had to be prepared to suffer those disruptions of his
rights which it was reasonable that the other part should impose. Where the other man's are
can be set aside that should be done; where the separation can be achieved only at later
stage, then separation has to await that later stage; if mixing of ores from different sources
was necessary (as in this case) then there should be mixing. Hence, oreS mixed with other
ore are lost unfortunately by commixito (the coming together of the mixing). In conclusion,
the A. D. favoured the acquisition of co-ownership of the right holders of the are, despite it
being an unusual, atypical manifestation of that institution. fhe reasons for this unusual co-
ownership are because of (i) the parties retained different rights upon the are being
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separated (U) such co-ownership was obtained only after the ore was refined (iii) the right
to abuse the property (jus abutendi) IS possible here (this is unusual) and (iv) finally, the
co-owner Las no right to veto in respect of the other mineral.
Gleason (1996), in his article "Mineral Rights: Loss of certainty" argues that this landmark
judgement has the potential to complicate the existing mineral rights system even further.
Commenting on the same judgement, a legal adviser to one mining group concluded that:
"this (judgement) creates an extraordinary me: J for everyone .... New mining decisions
until this clarified .. probably through a new Act will be fraught with uncertainty and many
may be delayed" (Gleason, 1996:3il.
3.3.5 III the case 0/ ErasmuS'vAfl'ikall{ier Proprietary Mi!.1.fsI.imite(/ 1976 (lJ SA
The Court found that the respondent (Afrikander Proprietary Mines Limited) had the right
to mine its proportionate share of the coal deposit as long as it did not prejudice the
applicant's (Erasmus's) rights. The applicant is the holder, under deed of cession of
mineral rights, of an undivided 1/520th share in the mineral rights in respect of the farm
B rakfonteln. Afrikander is the registered holder of an undivided 517/520th share in the
mineral rights. The applicant requested the court that the respondent should not be allowed
to carry out any mining without his authority.
Although the applicant was the holder of no more that 1/520th undivided share in the coal
rights in the Brakfontein and the respondent was the holder of a 517 /520th undi vided share,
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the respondent could not interfere or prejudice the applicant's rights without his consent.
r.efore the law the !'~plicant's and the respondent's rights were equal irrespective of the
fact that the applicant was holder of only 1/520th undivided share of the rights.
This case clearly demonstrates the extent to which the current mineral rights situation can
inhibit mineral development, As long as the current mineral rights policy remain in force
this kind of a situation can not be avoided. The mineral right as a right gives equal rights to
co-holders of mineral rights irrespective of the size of the mineral rights holding.
3.4 Sterlllsatlon of Mineral Rights
Sterilisation of mineral rights causes the inefficient and inequitable use of mineral
resources. According to Kruger et at (1991) there are three major factors which led to
sterilisation and fragmentation of mineral rights and thereby militate against optimal
exploitation of South African mineral resources. These are:
i) different laws for different commodities, some of which occur in the same
mine or deposit;
ii) the relevant legislation differs throughout South Africa; and
iii) The definition of the boundaries of mineral rights is based on cadastral data
and does not take into account the geological boundaries of an orebody.
A simple example of the complexities created for the explorationist by the above is the
proclamation of Sir John Cradock in 1813 that vested the rights to gold, silver and precious
3 Name of legal advisor and name of the m.nlng coml:f~Y withheld by Gleason.
stones in the State but no other minerals (Kruger F. J at el, 1991). Since this only applies to
the Cape Province, it means that only in this part of South Africa specific minerals
mentioned are consolidated under the State, whereas all other rights to the same land may
be endlessly subdivided. The above scenario could lead into the sterilisation of mineral
resources.
Most of the sterilised mineral rights belong to private mineral rights holders, namely
private companies, individuals and farmers who might own the surface and mineral rights.
Mining companies, such as JCI, by their own admission have assesses their mineral rights
portfolios and made properties available they classified as not part of their core business.
This indicates that the -nining companies have been sitting on viable deposits. Such a
situation is unlikely to change unless there are disincentives for holding mineral rights
without exploitation or there is a change in the ownership system.
3.5 Expropriation of Mineral Rights versus Natlonallsatlon
The existing South African law allows the State to acquire land or mineral rights by
expropriation in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. This expropriation is subject to
fair compensation being paid. A "fair" compensation is measured by the market value of
the property (right), the amount to make good of the actual financial loss caused by the
expropriation and the solatium' in terms of the Act.
The role of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 is to ensure the enjoyment of the fundamental
right (mineral right) and the freedom that goes with it, not to create a new source of
4 solatium implying the whole (full) compensation
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power for the state, but rather to be used for curtailing them. Evidently there is no record
whereby the Minister has applied the Act pointing to the fact that there is general
agreement between partners when dealing with mineral rights issues or that the Minister
lacks the seriousness to employ the Act.
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Nationalisation on the other hand creates different source of power whereby an asset is
placed under the control of nationals through the State taking possession. It may be done
with or without a 'fair' or market related compensation to the previous holders. This form
of acquisition of mineral rights was practised in many independent countries, e.g. Jamaica,
Zambia, Zaire, and Tanzania during the 1970s (Brown, 1986).
There are distinct differences between expropriation and nationalisation. In the first case
compensation is paid according to the market value of the property and the State may not
be involved in the actual mining business. In some cases the State participates in
partnership with the private sector, e.g. Botswana government and De Beers.
Nationalisation involves acquisition of mineral rights with or without a fair compensation
of the property. In this case the State is directly involved in the actual mining business. The
disastrous economic consequences caused by nationalisation resulted in near collapse of
the mining industry in these countries where it took place. Currently most of these
countries, e.g, Zambia, Zaire and Chile are engaged in reprivatisation of the mining
industry.
3.5.1 The Cost of Expropriation of Mineral Rights
P. J. Badenhorst et al ~1994) in an article "Proposed Nationalisation of Mineral Rights in
South Africa" outline the factors that influence the market value of a mineral as:
a) Factors inherent to the mineral deposit, namely:
i) The location of a mineral deposit;
ii) The statutory and common law restriction imposed on the exercising of rights
by the owner or holder of the mineral rights; and
iii) The physical features of the mineral deposit; and
b) Macro and micro market forces.
According to Badenhorst et al (1994) three categories of mineral rights can be acquired by
the State by expropriation:
i) mineral rights in the hands of unaware private individuals who are not in a
position to mine;
ii) II" '\ral rights in the hands of mining companies in respect of which no
mining infrastructure has been established and which are held in stock for
future exploitation;
iii) Mineral rights held by mining companies in respect of which mining
infrastructure had been established and which rights are being actively
mined.
Of the above mentioned mineral rights, category c) will be the most valuable due to the
infrastructure created to make it possible to have access to the mineral deposit and mine it.
Currently there is a brisk and competitive market in mineral right options, whereby the
mineral right holder confers the right to explore and purchase such mineral right on the
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grantee, Van Rooyen (1993) estimates that such options currently trade at annual
exploration fees in the range of R5 to R12 per hectare with purchase prices in the range of
R1000 to R4000 per hectare. Mineral rights A high potential ' -roven reserves) will be
more expensive than the price in the above-mentioned range.
The data given in Table 4.2 indicate that mineral rights held by private companies are
estimated to cover about 3293 000 hectares. At a price of R4 000 per hectare the State
would need approximately R13 billion to compensate for the expropriation of the mineral
rights in the hands of private companies. Since companies and individuals hold the richest
mineral rights, the bill for compensation will be far higl ..
given here.
the conservative estimate
Vorster (:1.994)gave another estimation of the value of the privately held mineral rights in
his paper "Mineral rights as real property cannot be arbitrarily alienated". He estimates a
value of R50 000 per hectare and an estimation of approximately R165 billion for the total
bill for the 3295 000 hectares, The annual interest (15% per annum) on government paper
would be about R25 billion.
Badenhorst et at (1994) concludes that expropriation at large scale is unlikely due to
several reasons. These are; firstly, that the administrative burden and costs involved in
determining and tracing the holders of all mineral rights in South Africa would be
enormous. Secondly, the administrative burden and litigation costs involved during the
expropriation process in terms of the P::'VJJ.l.{JD.'J,V. ,:t./'1£t (0.Qf 1975 would be enormous and
finally, the compensation payable for such mineral rights would run into billions of rands
(R71.2 billion as calculated by Vorster).
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It is clear from the above that the aim of the State in expropriation should be based only on
the need to achieve optimal utilisation of minerals and therefore uphold public interest,
which in tum would lead to economic growth and better living standards for all the
citizens.
3.6 Conclusion
The mineral rights system of South Africa is fairly complex with both the state and private
concerns owning mineral rights. The system has been further complicated by subsequent
legislation that separated the ownership of mineral rights from that of land. Legislation has
also permitted the ownership of different minerals in the same orebody by different parties.
The study cases point to some of the legal processes required to be undertaken in order to
access mineral rights. SMM companies would not have the legal and financial resources to
invest in such legal processes. Furthermore, each court ruling set precedence for
subsequent cases. These rulings therefore set the basis for future ownership of mineral
rights. For example, the case of Trojan Exploration v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Limited
clearly demonstrates the complexity of the South African mineral rights system. Assuming
instead of Rusplats there was a SSM company involved, the consequences of the litigation
may practically ruin the SSM company if not put it out of business completely. In the case
of Erasmus v Afrikander Proprietary Mines the difficulties of acquiring mineral rights are
also highlighted. Again, SSM companies would not be well positioned to ",ml with such
delays due to costs on capital caused by the delays.
As much as it is necessary to change some aspects of the current mineral rights policy,
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caution must be exercised in order to avoid the use of antiquated means of redress such as
nationalisation of the industry. Nationalisation will also contravene the Bill of Rights and
would be similar to the methods that were employed to deprive communities of their land
and other rights during the apartheid years.
In a time when most countries have moved away from nationalisation as a form of
acquisition of land and mineral resources, it is unlikely that the ANC government will
repeat Zambia and Zaire's mistakes. Nationalisation of copper and cobalt mines
exacerbated the collapse of the industry in the above-mentioned countries.
It is clear the government does not seem to have either the capacity or the desire to run the
mining industry (Segal, 1994). Based on the experiences of the above-mentioned countries,
nationalisation as means of rationalising the redistribution of wealth, optimising
exploration and exploitation of mineral resources will not be a viable option.
Expropriation under the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, although a likely avenue, has its
own flaws. The main question is whether the government may afford the costs involved in
the 'fair' compensation of privately held mineral rights, which may run into billions of
rands estimated to be R165 billion. Pressed by the need to improve living standards of her
citizens, South Africa does not have the resources to pay fo: the expropriation of the
mineral rights under private ownership.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CURRENT STATUS OF MINERAL RIGHTS
4.1 Introduction
Two schools of thought concerning mineral rights exist in South Africa. The Chamber of
Mines favours the current mineral rights system as the most appropriate for South African
conditions. On the other hand the ANC and its trade union alliance, aspirant SSM
companies and artisanal miners view the current status as favouring the big mining houses
(Minerals and Mining Policy Workshops, 1996).
The proposed mineral rights policies vary from "Proposed Nationalisation of Mineral
rights in South Africa" (Badenhorst et al, 1994), to the National Union Mineworkers'
(NUM's) proposal to tax companies which do not exploit or explore foi minerals in their
lease areas within a "reasonable time" (Robinson, 1995), to changing the existing situation
completely (Kruger, de Wit and Levin, 1991) and upholding of the status quo (van
Rooyen, 1993; Dale, 1996).
4.2 Common Objectives
Notwithstanding the different views concerning a new mineral right system all the
interested parties have some areas of common interest. They all agree that the policy
should assist in identifying suitable deposits and ways of making them available to small
scale operators, encouraging mineral rights holders, both State and private, to use them,
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establishing mechanisms to support and organise small scale mining and balancing the
needs of security (If tenure end State interference. Simultaneously, the mineral right system
must not negate the LSM industry. The State interference is only condoned when its
objective is optimal exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources (Vorster R.,
1995).
In order for the RDP, as set out by the government of national unity, to succeed all efforts
are required from every section of the South African economy and population. In this
regard, it is essential that mining continue contributing its share to the growth of the
national economy. Therefore, the State interference should ensure that this objective is
fulfilled.
4.3 Areas of Disagreement
There are several areas of disagreement among the stakeholders, i.e. the ANC, mining
companies, tribal people and aspirant SSM companies, with regard to the current mineral
rights system. The borne of contention is that, the system is not conducive to the optimal
exploration and exploitation of mineral resources and the system supports mal distribution
of the benefits arising from mining. Consequently various views, depending on the
background, on the choice of the new mineral rights exist among the interested parties
(Robinson, 1995).
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4.4 Dale's Model of Mineral Rights Policy
During the Minerals and Mining Policy Worksho i (1996), Dale presented a model policy
for mineral rights in South Africa. His proposed rr.ineral rights policy was used as the point
of reference for the debate on mineral rights.
Dale (1996) proposed a hybrid two-tier system of mineral rights. He envisages a system
tempered by a licensing mechanism and by the right to expropriate that would provide a
compromise and enable the achievement of the best of all worlds, namely for those who
wish to see complete State ownership of mineral rights and for the advocate for private
ownership of mineral rights. The system is seen as a compromise between a wholly private
mineral rights system and a wholly public mineral rights system and will be based on a
two-tier system of holding of mineral rights subject to control by a licensing mechanisi.,
and by State expropriation where necessary. The main objectives of the system will be to:
i) to achieve a non-adversarial result;
ii) to promote optimal exploration;
iii) to create investor friendly climate: certainty;
iv) to give access to small scale operators and
v) to improve access to other investors, foreign and domestic.
Advantages envisaged by this system are that;
i) It provides the benefits of private ownership based on the law of property,
while simultaneously providing the benefits of a State system;
ii) It avoids the unfavourable factors of both a private system and those of
State system; and
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Iii) While preserving private mineral right holdings it gives the State the facility
to tum existing State mineral right holdings to account by promoting them
for foreign and SSM and artisanal investment using existing mechanisms in
the existing legislation.
In Older to improve the implementation and administration of the two-tier system Dale
proposes the following guidelines for the State mineral rights:
i) State should identify and advertise mineralised areas available for
investment, be it small-scale, medium, large, foreign or domestic. This
applies in areas vhere the State is the holder of the mineral rights;
ii) State should establish standa.dised procedures, terms, conditions,
consideration, forms for acquisition by investors of mineral rights;
iii) State should simplify the administration of mineral rights.
Dale's approach to private mineral rignts requires the mineral rights policy to publish and
explain the policy to potential investors. The explanation should include how to access
Deeds Office information. acquire rights and overcome perceived difficulties with shares.
The model also aims at encouraging private mineral rights holders to further their efforts at
identifying and making available surplus mineral rights for small scale development.
In respect to all mineral rights, Dale proposes that the Policy should recommend;
i) Expediting the computerisation of information in regard to mineral
right holdings at Deeds Offices and the provision of funds to this
end;
ii) Overlaying of the mineral diagrams system onto the land diagram
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system and recording of the g-lJlogical information that is in the
public domain;
iii) Recording identity of holders of geological information as part of
Deeds Office records;
iv) Equipping of Regional Directors' offices as an advice and
information facility and
v) Establishment of advice bureaux for small-scale mining operators.
The ultimate goal of Dale's proposed model is to promote investor confidence and to
afford more efficient procedures to ensure access to acquisition of mineral rights for all
investors, large, medium, small, artisanal, domestic and foreign. This model, however, is
essentially that of creating a market for minerals rights, with limits to the standard free
enterprise market.
4.4.1 Opposition to Dale's Policy Model
Dale's mineral rights policy model is opposed on the grounds that it seeks to uphold the
status quo negating the fact that currently mineral rights are held in an extremely
complicated and inflexible way by a multitude of holders. Kruger (1996) proposes
transformation that benefits all and that is not based on coercion. Coercion, he postulates,
will build resentment within the industry. He therefore indicated the following as the
requirements for the transformation'
i) There must be access to mineral rights or land for exploration as
well as the availability of technical information, preferably at a one-
stop-shop;
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ii) The system must be able to address the diverse claims of tribal and
other communities and individuals of their rights in the past;
iii) The holders of the mineral rights must able to derive the benefit of
ownership;
iv) Licensing and other permissions must be easily obtainable from the
one-stop-shop to encourage small operators and
v) The ownership of mineral rights and the right to prospect must be
deJinked.
Kruger (1996) in his contribution does not acknowledge the achievements that the mining
industry has made under the current mineral rights policy.
4.4.2 African National Congress and National Union of Mine workers
The ANC's Freedom Charter of 1955 states that" The people shall share in the country's
wealth" and "The mineral wealth beneath the soil .... shall be transferred to the people as a
whole". This declaration remains the cornerstone of the ANC's approach to mineral rights.
It is widely held within the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Union
Mineworkers (NUM) that the Chamber of Mines' belief that the present system guarantees
long-term security, is aimed at maintaining the monopolistic position of the mining houses
and that this belief has led to the sterilisation of mineral rights (RObinson, 1995), Jourdan
(1993), in his discussion of the way mineral rights are held and distributed, cites the major
disadvantages of the current system as it" racial bias, its inordinate complexity aud the fact
that most of the promising geological terrains are effectively frozen as the owners of the
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mineral rights (the major mining companies) are able to 'sit' on these properties in
perpetuity.
The RDP, as stated in the ANC Discussion Document of 1994, seeks the return of mineral
rights to the democratic state, in line with the rest of the world which in turn will give the
people control over the optimum exploitation of mineral resources. It is also stated that the
principal objective of the RDP, with regards to the mining industry, is the transformation of
the industry to serve all the people of South Africa.
To achieve this transformation, the government has to consider ways and means to
encourage small-scale mining and enhance opportunities for participation by the people of
South Africa through ~.lpport, including financial and technical aid and access to mineral
rights. The ANC envisages the possibility of creating special mining zones in which the
small-scale mines can be set up (ANe Discussion Document, 1994).
Facilitating access to mineral rights is viewed by the ANC as a means of encouraging
greater participation in the mining industry, Unlocking the mineral wealth tied up in
privately owned mineral rights is also aimed at ensuring greater access to mineral rights
(ANC Discussion Document, 1994). In the case of the State being the holder of all mineral
rights, it is argued that this will assist in the creation of a one-stop shop for mineral rights,
consequently reducing the cost of doing business for the S'3M companies. Not only may
this be conducive to junior mining companies, argues the ANC, but it may also encourage
foreign investors to look at the mining opportunities in South Africa.
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The ANC, in its 1994 discussion document, proposed that a tax on mineral rights be
introduced. Such a tax would be wholly deductible against exploration expenditure, and
would guarantee the lodging of information with the central authority for further investors.
This would result in greater exploration and realisation . mineral potential, an incentive to
sell to other new err mts and finally, the possible abandonment to the State, thereby
opening it up for new entrants via the licensing system. Such a system, it is argued, would
ensure that security and tenure of existing mines remain and new mines could be given
adequate tenure through exploration and mining licensing systems such as existing in
Botswana.
After independence, Botswana introduced a tax of about $10 per hectare on mineral rights,
which could be deducted against exploration costs. The result is that most mineral rights
are now State owned (Jourdan 1994).
The ultimate goal of this approach is to allow a retention of private mineral right- for
existing operations, but open up the system for unexploited areas. A tax OIl privately owned
mineral rights may also encourage mining companies with unexploited properties to move
ahead with exploitation or sell the rights to other companies (Jourdan, 1994)
4.4.2.1 Vaal Reefs-A South African Case Study
Vaal Reefs is the second largest gold mine in South Africa, milling approximately 12
million tonnes per annum at a grade of about 6.4g/t to produce roughly 75 tonnes of gold.
From inception in 1944 and from the dates of expansions, Vaal Reefs had produced to
September 1993 a total of 220.290 million tonnes ore, at an average yield of 8,9 g/t to
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produce 1 987,461 tonnes of gold (Levin G and Handley, 1993). The financial results
during this period are shown in Table 3.3.
These results show that despite the fact that the mineral rights do not belong to the State,
the State enjoyed a greater return than the shareholders without any capital risk. This case
study also illustrates the fact that the flow of benefits from the exploitation of mineral
resources is not only dependent upon the ownership of mineral rights. Mining taxation
addresses this issue through systems involving royalties and various taxation options to
secure a flow of benefits that represents a sharing of the benefits of exploitation between
mine operators, other stakeholders and the state.
TABLE 3.3 :VAAL REEFS FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM 1944-1993
ITEM RMILLION PERCENT
-Total gold revenue 26583 -
Profit before taxation 12155 100
Taxation 4402 36,2
Dividends 3993 32,9
Capital Expenditure 376O 30,9
Source: Levine G. and Handley J" 1993
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4.4.3 Chamber of Mines
4.4.3.1 Background
The Chamber of Mines of South Africa was founded in 1889. Membership of the Chamber
has traditionally been virtually by all gold mines and coal producers in the country. The
Cham; .er of Mines has not organised producers of base minerals and other metals to the
same extent as those of gold and coal. Some companies, such as Lonrho and RTZ, have
chosen not to join the Chamber mainly for political reasons (Erricson, 1995),
The Chamber of Mines has been (and still is) the policy mouthpiece for the South African
mining industry. One of the Chamber of Mines' key activities is its representation of the
formalised policy position of its membership to various organs of South Africa's national
and provincial governments, and to other relevant policy-making and opinion-forming
entities inside the country, and internationally (Chamber of Mines of South Africa, 1996).
4.4.3.2 The Chamber of Mines' Views
Private ownership of mineral rights is criticised for the following reasons:
- That it is not conducive to the optimal exploration and exploitation of mineral
resources, and
• That it supports a maldistribution of the benefits derived from mining.
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According to the Chamber of mines, the first criticism ignores the enormous success
achieved both in mining and in the expansion and growth of the mining industry in South
Africa (Chamber of Mines of South Africa, 1996). With regards to the second criticism, the
Chamber of Mines argues that the criticism ignores the fact that distribution of benefits
from mining is the product of a very complex interaction of factors such as past job
reservation, conditions of employment, taxation, mining lease consideration, and
shareholding investment in mining companies (whether directly or indirectly through
pension funds). Given that influencing factors, i.e. job reservation, conditions of
employment etc. were the same there is no reason to suggest that State ownership of
mineral rights would have caused any difference to the distribution of benefits derived
from mining.
Erricson (1995), in his discussion of the Mining Policy in the New South Africa, outlines
three points that are deemed to be of crucial importance by the Chamber of Mines:
i) The mineral rights system is central to the South African industry's leading-
edge capabilities in deep-level and large and long-term mining projects.
This system has encouraged massive expenditure in exploration and
acquisition of mineral rights. To bring all the mineral rights under
government stewardship is said to be damaging to the investor confidence
and therefore not viable. To seek to transfer these mineral rights to the State
would also be complicated, costly and inequitable. It would result in the
industry reducing its commitment to the kinds of large technologically
complex projects that the Chamber of Mines sees as necess ary.
ii) The SSM sector has merits and benefits but can in no way hecome a major
and vibrant force in South Africa. In this respect, it is argued that the
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mineral rights held by compames are not suitable for SSM projects and it is
possible that the State may have more suitable areas that could be
distributed for SSM.
iii) The Chamber of Mines would like to see minimal government interference.
It cautions Government against embarking on an interventionist route as
taken by other African countries, such as Ghana and Zambia, after gaining
independence.
Private ownership of mineral rights makes it possible for the mineral rights to be traded
and exchanged. Not only has the security of tenure benefited the big mining houses, but
has also benefited the junior companies or individuals as the title to mineral rights can be
pledged to obtain development finance. Further to this the Chamber of Mines argues that
the existence of private ownership of mineral rights within South African law is consistent
with a market economy and is part of the balance struck between private enterprise and
state control (Chamber of Mines of South Africa, 1996).
In a paper entitled "Mineral Rights and SSM -The View from Gold Fields" (Van Rooyen,
1993) it is argued that the following should be the guidelines for a poli r-" ,
- Do not interfere with the free market in private minerals,
- Encourage private sector exploration of State controlled minerals.
r~l rights:
Van Rooyen argues that a policy based on the above guidelines may encourage and
accommodate both small-scale and large-scale enterprises. Paradoxically this approach has
resulted in the marginalisation of the small-scale sector and will not improve the situation.
Van Rooyen's guidelines are basically in line with the Chamber of Mines and seek to
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maintain the status quo.
Segal (1994:3) in his discussion on "Post-Election Mineral Policy: The case Against
Radical Change" said, "the industry's objections to a change of the current mineral rights
system is based on the fears of problems that are inherent in publicly-owned mineral rights
systems. These can include bureaucratic inefficiency and in some cases malpractice". In his
view, by trying to change the mineral rights system, the RDP fails to appreciate the
strategic and regulatory powers already invested in the government.
4.4.4 Views oj Aspirant Small Scale Miners
Aspirant small- scale miners encompasses all individuals and private companies that seek to
exploit the minerals of South Africa at a scale that can not be large- scale or artisanal. The
absence of the commercial SSM industry on the South African mining stage is largely due
to a lack of access to mineral rights and the lack of venture capital and entrepreneurship.
Views advanced by most aspirant SSM mining companies at the Mineral Policy workshop
in Pretoria (1996), were that the would-be entrant encounters difficulties stemming from
two sources, namely access to mineral rights on a willing buyer - willing seller principle to
underlie the negotiations process; and access to and availability of as well as the cost of
information (Mineral Policy Workshop Proceedings, 1996). 11 is also pointed out that
although the Mineral Act does require prospecting data io be furnished to the state, in
practice companies have applied for perpetual confidentiality.
There is a growing sentiment from spok J' - ,s for aspirant SSM that the government
should just usurp dormant mineral rights 10 .iable (he small-scale sector t(' do business.
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This was evident from the presentations to the Workshop on Minerals and Mining Policy
by many of the aspirant small-scale miners.
4.4.5 The Views of the Provincial Administrators
The provinces (Northern Province and Western Cape) prefer the mineral rights to be under
State control (Northern Province Mineral Development Summit, 1996). Unproductive
freezing of mineral rights and barriers against the entry of new entrants has been cited as
the major reasons for this preference. With no evidence to confirm that State-held mineral
rights would result in less mineral development, the provincial governments argue that the
crucial factor for continued growth in mineral development is that security of tenure is
guaranteed, within statutory time constraints, after exploration is started (Northern
Province, Draft Mineral Policy Discussion Framework).
4.4.6 Views of the Tribal People: A Case of the Lebowa
V, al exploitation of the minerals in the Lebowa region could be achieved only with the
facilitation of prospecting and mining. The benefits derived from the exploitation of
mineral resources should accrue not only exclusively to the entrepreneur and the inve 'tor,
but also to the employees involved in the exploitation process and the local community.
Some of the Lebowa Mineral Trust's (LMT's) policies on mineral rights are: a) the LMT
endorses the system of free enterprise as this system is attractive to potential investors
within and outside the Lebowa region and will lead to the speediest progress of the
purposeful minerals development in the territory; and b) the LMT grants prospecting or
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mining rights only to applicants who have the necessary technical and financial ability to
execute an appropriate exploration or development programme. The LMT"s approach does
not seek to exclude the smaller entrepreneur from obtaining prospecting and mining rights.
The tribal representatives (Policy on Mineral Policy Workshop, 1996) argue for the returr,
of the mineral rights in the trust land to the traditional authorities. The appointment of
Trustees or turning trust mineral rights to the State is viewed as an infringement of private
property and thus counters productive. The tribal leaders also reject the representation of
Lebowa by : ' ~ LMT. On the other hand the LMT supports the view expressed by the tribal
leaders. The LMT agrees that the practice of mineral rights being held in trust for local
communities requires fundamental review. This therefore invalidates any reason to retain
the trustee system.
4.5 Mineral Rights Systems in other Countries
Kruger and de WH (1987) outline two extreme philosophies with regard to mineral
ownership in different countries, depending on their guiding political philosophy. These
are (1) total State ownership of both mineral rights and means of production, and (2) total
private ownership of both. Muny countries fall in the middle ground between these
extremes in that the State usually owns some or all mineral rights, and finding and
exploration of minerals thereof is usually left to the private sector. The State, e.g. Canada,
in effect extracts royalties in return for security of tenure, infrastructure and political
stability.
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In me e developed, mineral-rich and highly successful mining countries, e.g. Australia and
Canada, there is a tendency toward State ownership of mineral rights but private
exploration and exploitation. Zambia, Botswana, Malawi and New Guinea's mineral codes
a e contrasted by Brown (1986) to that existing in Zimbabwe. In essence, these codes rest
on two principles: a) the right to prospect and mine is granted (often to multinational
corporation) in return for specific commitments which can be assessed and monitored by
the State, and b) the investment is secure within sensible limits of long term. The State is
thus normally a major partner in the mining projects.
In contrast to the legal environment in Botswana and the other countries mentioned above,
Zimbabwe has retained its pre-independence mining code (Zimbabwe Mining Code, 1980).
The code enshrines a system that ensures that the country as a whole is held open to
prospecting and mining by private sector. Claims are kept alive annually by obtaining
inspection certificates from the Minmg Commissioner. A detailed account of historical
evolution of mineral rights in the Southern African Development Community is given in
Appendix II.
4.6 Conclusion
The above discussion leads to a clear conclusion that the majority of th; stakeholders, e.g,
foreign mining companies, aspirant SSM companies and ANC, in the South African
mining industry dispute the fairness of the current mineral rights system. The question of
the unfairness of the mineral rights system is not on debate but ruther the future mineral
rights system. Though seemingly clear that tb ~ current mineral rights system is unfair there
are strong arguments for both abolishing and retaining the system as it is. There is therefore
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a strong case for looking at the current mineral rights in order to formulate a system that
encourages more participation in the mining industry by foreign companies and smaller
local companies. Hence, it is inevitable that the present system may not be retained as it is.
In order to bring about this change, it may be necessary to simplify the very complex legal
procedures to change ownership and facilitate access to mineral rights.
Dale's model mineral rights policy seeks to retain the current mineral rights system in
South Africa. This structure while allowing the trading of mineral rights, may continue to
benefit the large mining houses who have ie2;al and financial resources and ignores the
need for a one-stop shop for mineral rights, which is one of the main benefits of the State
owned mineral rights system. A one-stop-shop concept has worked well in countries where
the mineral rights are under State ownership. Dale's approach tries to evade the current
problem of access to mineral rights by pushing it forward for future generations.
The ANC's proposed solution in its current position of authority strikes a more
reconciliatory accord with the mining houses than its pre-election approach. A5 the
government gains more confidence ill its macro-economic policies, it will be under
pressure to deliver on some of its pre-election promises regarding the redistribution of
wealth and mineral rights in particular. The government's main efforts, as stated in the
ANC's views, will be the equitable distribution of the wealth derived from South Africa's
mineral wealth, provision of access to mineral rights on a non-racial basis and creation of
an environment for growth in national economy fuelled by both domestic, foreign, small
and large investors. The government has ruled out nationalisation of mineral rights but it is
likely to institute some form of taxation as a disincentive for holding on to undeveloped
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mineral rights, thereby encouraging the mining houses to reduce their mineral rights
holdings.
The Chamber of Mines' arguments on the retaining of the current mineral rights system in
order to ensure security of tenure in the industry j~ unlikely to persuade the government to
maintain the status quo. A positive approach by the Chamber, as shown by JCT, De Beers
and Anglovaal (Wadula, August 13, 1996), could assist in diffusing the current hostile
attitude in which the Chamber is held.
Although the Chamber of Mines is regarded, by the ANC and its alliance, as aiming to
maintain the status quo there is need to fully appreciate and understandwhy we are where
we are with the current systerr •. The State mineral rights have a portion of inefficiency and
are also associated with less development. The underdevelopment has been attributed to
the fact that there is a lower degree of prospectivity on State mineral right holdings.
Hypothetically, this shows how mining houses, under the prevailing mineral rights system,
have efficiently approached their exploration and mining programs.
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CHAPTERS
MINERAL POLICY MODEL
5.1 Introduction
The model that South Africa should follow should be that of Swaziland (Appendix II),
where the entire country have been divided out into concessions of some form or another.
This model represents the closest similarity to the South African mineral rights situation
where the entire country is divided into concessions belonging either 10 the State,
companies or individuals. In 1958, the Swazi nation placed a tax on all concessions. To
date all mining concessions are under State control. This was achieved without having to
pay any compensation co the private owners. It is argued that the tax worked as a
disincentive for withholding mining concessions.
The model need not be adopted without specific consideration of the South African
situation. For example, the application of a mineral rights tax might not be workable
because of its inherent administrative constraints, South Africa has a developed mining
industry (compared to that of Swaziland) which has been security of tenure driven. Any
imposition d tax on mineral rights and the consequent reverse of mineral rights to the State
could result in poor investor confidence.
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5.2 The Mineral Rights Policy of SWaziland
The mineral rights situation in Sv, aziland after it gained independence in 1968 was
summarised by Levin and Handley (1993) in their discussion of the Evolution of Mineral
Rights in Sout+ .n Africa (originally summarised by Leistner and Smit in 1969) as
follows:
" ..practically the whole area of the country was covered two, three or even four deeps by
concessions of all sizes, for different purposes and greatly varying periods. In but a very
few cases were even the boundaries defined, many of the areas had been subdivided and
sold many times, and seldom were the boundaries of the superimposed areas even
coterminous. In addition to this, concessions were granted for all lands and minerals
previously unallotted or which had been allotted, might lapse or become forfeited, Finally
it must be remembered, that over three or four strata of conflicting interests, boundaries
and periods, the natural rights of the Datives to live, move, cultivate, graze or hunt had to
be preserved.
"As might be expected, various problems arose over land rights and this was one of the
most pressing matters that claimed the attention of the British authorities when they took
over the administration of Swaziland after the Anglo-Boer War. A commission was
appointed to investigate the land question and its recommendations took the form of the
Concessions Proclamation (No. 28) of 1907. According to this proclamation one-third of
all mineral rights held by concessionaires had to be ceded to the Swazi nation. If the
Swazis wanted more land, compensation had to be paid, in which case special permission
had to be obtained from the High Commissioner. The Swazis had no rights in respect of
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two-thirds of the areas held by concessionaires, but they could not be removed before a
period offive years had lapsed.
"Mining rights were granted wi.h other surface concessions, and this complicated the entire
concession problem and retarded the country's mining development. The commission
appointed in 1904 to investigate the concession prob' urveyed the mineral concessions
and determined which were in force prior to and which were in force subsequent to the
granting of the surface concessions on the same area. Measures were taken to reconcile
conflicting land and mineral concessions in Swaziland Surface Rights Proclamation (No.
12) of 1910.
"In 1958 the Swaziland Mining Proclamation was promulgated which introduced a tax on
all mineral concessions whether or not they were being exploited. If concessionaires
refused to pay the taxes the rights could be transferred to the Crown.
" The taxation induced many holders of minerals concessions to surrender their rights.
Before the Proclamation came into effect in 1958 mineral concessions were held by private
persons or institutions on 51.57 per cent of the surface area of Swaziland. In 1965 the
Crown (at present the Svzazi nation) exercised full control over mineral rights over 87.03
per cent of Swaziland's surface area.
By the time of independence in 1968 between 40-50 per cent of the surface land had been
restored to Swazi control and the proportion ill the early 1980's was about 67 per cent.
According to Levin and Handley since then there has been continuation of the process and
today all mineral rights are now vested in the Swazi nation.
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53 Conclusion
The mere existence of interesting mineralisation does not ensure that a viable mine can be
developed, particularly by small operators. Even assuming ownership of mineral rights and
adequate geological information, successful mining requires appropriate funding, skills and
technology. An environment where small operators have access to these requirements is
needed. It is argued that even before the finalisation of the new mineral policy, moves are
being made already to accommodate the small mining investor. For an example JeI and De
Beers have started a process of releasing those mineral rights that are suitable for SSM but
do not meet their viability criteria.
Simplification of the mining laws is vital. The simplification of the mineral rights system
will benefit both the small-scale and large-scale mining companies by removing the
complexities caused by subdivision and open up sterilised reserves for exploitation by
other interested parties.
The need to rationalise the procedures and processes of acquisition of mineral rights and
the equitable distribution of mineral rights can not be underestimated. It is vital, however,
that all facets of this rationalisation are considered without emotions.
Importing any system that might have worked in any other country without prior
considerations of the specific aspects of the South African mining industry should be
discouraged.
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CHAPTER 6
FORMULATIN'T A POLiCY FOR THE SSM INDUSTRY
6.1 Introduction
The Minerals Policy Process was initiated by the appointment of the Steering Committee,
which operated with the mandate to manage the process of mineral policy formulation in
an open and transparent way allowing for full stakeholder participation. Three main
consultative actions were organised as shown in figure 8. A total of 62 written submissions
setting forth a vision or South Africa's mineral policy were received. Employers, foreign
mining companies, labour, communities, central and provincial government, professionals
and interested groups also made submissions. Various government departmer+, central
and provincial and all the interested parties then engaged in bilateral meetings, which
culminated into public workshops.
The responsibilities of the Steering Committee were to summarise all the recommendations
and proposals from the public meetings into a chopping block document, which was later
used as a reference to the preceding public meetings and bilateral consultations. To date the
process has reached the stage whereby the Minister of Minerals and Energy has presented
the white paper on the Minerals Policy to parliament.
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FIGURE 8: MINERALS POLICY PROCESS
Public WorkshopsWritten Bilateral Meetings-------
Two workshops with some 400
attending.
Provincial Executive Councils;
Mpumalanga
Northern Cape
Western Cape
Northern Province
Free State
Gauteng
North-West
Minister of Land Affairs
Minister of Water Affairs and
Forestry
Department of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism
Department of Finance
Department of Labour
Ministerial advisors to :
Deputy President Mbeki
Department of Trade and
Industry
Foreign mining companies
Mining investment analysts
Environmental groups
Organised agriculture
Publication of Discussion
Document on Minerals and
Mining policy for South Africa,
November 1995 Wide range of stakeholders
attended and aired their views:
Received 62 written submissions
including 12 statements setting
forth a vision for South Africa's
mineral policy.
Large and small mining
companies
Labour
New entrants
Small mmers
Foreign companies
Government officials
Professionals
Traditional leaders
Organised agriculture
Submissions made by employers,
foreign mining companies,
labour, communities, central and
provincial government,
professionals and interest groups.
Further submissions made in
course of bilateral consultations.
D
Views of stakeholders consulted in the course of preparing the
Minerals and Mining Policy Green Paper
Source: Discussion Document on a Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa (1995)
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6.2 Policy for the SSM Industry and National Objectives
The mineral rights should be a component of the policy on minerals, which in tum is part
of a broader national economic policy. It should therefore enable the SSM sector to
optimally exploit mineral resources alongside the mining industry as a whole, and thereby
contribute to the overall national objectives (Buck K. W. and Elver R.H., 1970). The
mineral policy cannot be formulated around SSM, but SSM must be accommodated as part
of the broad overall picture. Compared to LSM, SSM requires assistance in putting up
infrastructure like roads and electricity. The ultimate goals of the mineral rights policy are
to provide easy access to mineral rights and an equitable distribution of mineral rights
together with security of tenure of land which will result in the derivation of maximum
benefits for South Africa out of the minerals won from the land and achieving optimum
allocat.on of mineral extraction between present and the future.
Policy objectives in support of these goals are as follows:
- Relate mineral development by the SSM sector to social needs. The
exploitation of a mineral resource should not be to the detriment of the socio-
economic development of the inhabitants of the territory;
- Minimise the adverse effects of mineral development by the small-scale mining
industry on the environment but m ' .dl~·allowances so that compliance costs do not
kill the project. The LSM industry, because of its experience, can help in advising
the SSM companies on best ways for minimising environmental damage;
- Foster a viable SSM sector by letting the industry run on a competitive base. This
requires the State to assist the sector with those essential requirements like roads
without undue subsidisation of the sector;
- Ensure national self-determination in mineral development and
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- Strengthen the contribution by the SSM sector to regional/national development.
The benefits derived from the SSM, as well as from the LSM sector, should not
only accrue exclusively to the entrepreneur and the investor, but also to the
employees involved in the exploitation process and the.Local community.
6.3 Role of State Institutions
In as far as the SSM industry is concerned the state should not discriminate in favour of the
sector. However, the state institutions should playa facilitating role to lessen entry barriers
that the SSM sector faces with regard to acquisition of mineral rights.
The duties of the government departments are indicated in the Minerals Act, 1991 as
follows, "To regulate the prospecting for and optimal exploitation, processing and
utilisation of minerals, to provide f( ) safety and health of persons concerned in mines
and won .." to regulate the order .on and the rehabilitation of the surface of land
during and after prospecting ning operations, and to provide for matters connected
therewith".
It is clear from the above statement that the government's role is in regulating and
controlling the SSM (mining) industry, ensuring that the national interest is protected as far
as possible. Through the provision of infrastructure and services and the establishment of a
sound institutional and legislatix e regime, the government can provide the stable
framework within which SSM can develop (Jeru.ings N. S., 1993).
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6.3 Moral Consideration
From a purely moral point of view, the assessment of any proposal relating to the
utilisation of State owned mineral resources should take cognisance of the concept that the
State includes the total population. As far as mineral rights are concerned, they should
therefore be considered not as the property of the government or civil service, but rather as
public p ope.ty. The Department of Minerals and Energy is therefore seen in this role as
being appointed by government to manage this property in public interest on the same basis
as any private owner would manage his own property (Department of Minerals and
Energy, 1994).
6.4 Conclusion
The South African minerals policy formulation has been approached democratically with
all stakeholders being offered the opportunity to present their views. The inherent
advantages in the formulation process are that the Pl,'t<.:SS is transparent and does not
voluntarily exclude any particular interested groups. The resultant policy should therefore
reflect the opinion of the majority of the stakeholders. Its disadvantages are because of the
democratic process that has been followed, South Africa has been almost without a
minerals policy since 1Q94. The resultant policy might not, even though it may be the
opinion of the majority of the stakeholders, be necessarily the best of the growth of the
industry.
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CHAPTER"!
A MODEL POLlCY TO PROMOTE THE SSM INDUSTRY
7.1 Intent
Government will encourage and facilitate the development of the small exploration and
mining sectorr and will provide advice to them based on business principles.
7.2 Policy Requirements
i) Due to the complexity of South Africa's mineral rights system, SSM require
information on the availability of mineral rights.
The model policy to promote the SSM industry will provide access to mineral rights for
SSM by improving the quality and availability of informntion on mineral rights by way of
computerisation, Accessing the computerised database will be possible fr0111the different
provinces of the country. On this database the mineral rights will be registered and past
results of exploration will be recorded. The availability of past exploration data will reduce
the time spent on exploration and at the same time gives the previous mineral right holder
the chance to recover costs.
No accurate records are available on the exact minerai .ights holdings by both the State and
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private sector. A national audit of these mineral rights should be conducted. This can assist
in identifying State mineral rights that are amenable to SSM. The audit will also assist in
identifying the privately owned mineral rights that are locked-up (held up not as a long-
term business plan).
ii) Access to mineral rights and to the areas necessary to exploit these rights is
required.
In terms of sections 6,8 and q of the Minerals Act (1991) the Regional Director without
the prior permission of the mineral rights holder may issue no prospecting or mining
authorisation. Despite all the provisions relating to the issue of prospecting or mining
authorisations the Act is no way prescriptive regarding the approach of the mineral rights
holder when the granting or refusal of such permit is considered.
In cases where the State is a mineral rights holder, sections 6(3), 8(2) and 9(2) of the Act
provide that the Minister of Minerals and Energy can grant the said permission. This points
to the fact that it would be relatively easy for the State to provide SSM companies with
access to its own mineral rights. Therefore, it is more appropriate that the State first look
into ways of improving access to mineral rights in areas where the State is the mineral
rights holder before looking into privately owned mineral rights.
According to Section 43 of Minerals Act of 1991, immediately prior to the commencement
of thi, Act, a landowner could lay an exclusive claim on the mineral where the State
previously owned the mineral rights to precious stones and precious minerals. The
landowner is also deemed the sole holder of the right to such mineral in respect of such
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land for a period of five years or any longer period as may be approved by the Minister,
This particular section inhibits access to mineral rights to the previously disadvantaged
groups since these groups do not land or own very small tracks of land, To provide an
. equitable distribution of the said mineral rights there is need to revise Section 4 and amend
it to fit with the democratic situation prevailing in the country .
iii) A register on mineral rights should be compiled,
At present, there is no register for mineral rights and different rights to minerals can be
ceded at various stages from various titles, Also the certificate to all rights to minerals can
be subdivided into a prospecting contract; a cession of diamonds rights, from which a
prospecting contract and mineral lease can be issued; a mortgage bond can be taken out on
the rights; a cession of gold rights and a cession coal rights. A register of mineral rights
will therefore be compiled in conjunction with the one-stop-shop,
The one-stop-shop will consist of two components, These arc: a register for mineral .ights,
which will provide access on the availability of mineral rights; and a record of potential
mineral resources, which will provide access to physical information about mineral
resources, As far as the second objective of enabling conditions for SSM development is
concerned, the Department of Minerals and Energy's section of mineral promotion is in the
process of implementing a project in co- peration with the Council for Geoscience and
other government departments, The aim of this undertaking to set up a Geographical
Information System (One-Stop-Shop), to be managed by the Department of Minerals and
Energy, which will contain national information about minerai deposits, mine dumps,
prospecting and mining permits and licences, etc, Together with the register of mine ral
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rights the system will give a comprehensive one-stop-shop for mineral rights, known are
deposits and geological occurrences.
IV) The section of the Department of Minerals and Energy responsible for SSM should
be strengthened.
The existing section in the Directorate Mine Economics of the Department of Minerals and
Energy that deals with issues related to SSM is essential and should be strengthened. This
section assists the small mining companies with the necessary information on mineral
rights and suitable geological occurrences and also negotiates leases with mineral rights
holders on behalf of the SSM companies. The section will also assist the SSM companies
with the negotiation for mineral leases with the Minister of Minerals and Energy in the
case where the Gover.iment owns the mineral rights.
For effective functioning, the section of the Department of Minerals and Energy that deals
with issues relating to SSM will work together with other governmental and non-
governmental institutions in identifying mineral rights suitable for exploitation by the SSM
sector. Th€: following institutions are critical in assisting the SSM sector with access to
mineral rights:
a) The Council for Geoscience will provide geological information on
mineral occurrences:
b) Industrial Deve •• pment Corporation and ptrastatal finance companies will
provide the finance for acquisition of mineral rights which have been
properly evaluated and found to be of economic value;
c) The Minerals and Energy Policy Centre will iiase with communities and
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source their support.
d) The Council for Science and Industrial Research will evaluate the nature
of the mineral occurrence in order to develop the necessary technology to
be used in mining and pro: essing of the mineral and
iv) Technical assistance and training is required for SSM in the broad spectrum of the
mining activities.
Evaluation or appreciation of a mineral right requires some knowledge of technical
evaluations of such properties. SSM, especially those emerging from the artisanal type of
mining do not posses the expertise to carry out these specialised .echniques. Assistance is
therefore required with regard to these matters.
v) Access to investment finance is required.
In setting a SSM adequate finance is one of the prerequisites for the success of the project.
Finance is required initially for the purchase of mineral rights and for prospecting and
exploration. The SSM sector need to be developed through finance and support of
organisations such as the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC), the Industrial
Development Corporation (IDC) 01' any other similar organisation, which require that the
enterprise be run in accordance with sound business practices.
This component and component iv, above aim to facilitate the SSM companies access to
finance and to appropriate mining and processing techniques. There is a close relationship
between technical and financial issues. Reducing risks, and enhancing or assuring the
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profitability of a small mining project can, in principal, only be achieved with better
knowledge of geology and geometry of the deposit, and the use of appropriate mining
methods and techniques for increased productivity. This information can only be gathered
by implementing a comprehensive prospecting programme and hiring experts in geology,
mining and processing. As financial institutions and investors require a return on their
investment, they are unlikely to provide capital for projects that have not been planned and
evaluated sufficiently to give a reasonable assurance of potential for such a return.
vi) Disincentives required for discouraging the locking-up of mineral rights.
The introduction of a mineral rights tax or application of the "use it" or "lose it" principle
could be used to discourage the lock-up of mineral rights simultaneously encouraging new
entrants and foreign investors. A mineral right tax is more preferable as it does not set a
time frame for a company to use or lose its mineral rights. But due to the administrative
constraints in the Department of Minerals and Energy such a tax could be very costly to
impose unless there are proper mechanisms to enforce this tax it may yet be another form
of red tu""; to the mining industry. The impact of such a tax on the mining industry should
be investigated to the fullest.
With mineral rights not amenable for IBM reverting back to the State plus the State
owned mineral rights a one-stop-shop can then be created. The purpose of the one-stop-
shop would be to bring together all the necessary information on mineral rights (ownership
and location), geological information and past exploration results under the Directorate
Mine Economics in the Department of Minerals and Energy. It is necessary that the
Directorate Mine Economics Iiase with other directorates in processing of mineral rights
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leases and identifying possible geological occurrences suitable for SSM activities.
The new mineral rights policy will be introduced gradually to cushion the adverse effects
of a speedy implementation on the industry. The suggested period for implementation will
be five years.
7.3 Policy Proposals
i) Information on all aspects relating to mineral development (including mineral
rights) and exploitation will be made available by the Department of Minerals and
Energy by means of a one-stop shop.
ii) Information on State owned mineral rights available for development should be
widely published for the benefit of the mining industry, particularly, of SSM. The
information in regards to mineral right holdings at Deeds offices will be
computerised and funds will be provided to this end.
iii) Mining companies with substantial holdings of mineral rights will be encouraged to
examine their portfolios regularly, with a view of identifying potential areas they do
not wish to mine and making these available to other developers, especially SSM.
Disincentives or incentives will be used to discourage locking-up of mineral rights
by the private sector without jeorpadising future business plans for the sector.
iv) Government will interfere in common rights in order to achieve object of optimal
utilisation of minerals. Government should be able to use the Expropriation Act, in
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order to allow prospecting and mining. Grounds for expropriation should be of
public interest.
v) Uniform laws (simplified) and regulations will apply to both LSM and SSM.
vi) The Department of Minerals and Energy, in conjunction with other relevant
Government departments, will streamline the regulatory and administrative
procedures in respect of mineral exploration, mineral exploitation and acquisition
of mineral rights or mineral leases. The easing of access to mineral rights will apply
to those mineral rights owned by the State.
vii) Government departments, development agencies and provincial governments will
work towards co-ordinating their activities in respect of the promotion of small-
scale economic activities.
viii) To encourage proper governance of the SSM sector the Government will not give
cash handouts to the sector. A development fund run on commercial basis will be
set up to support SSM.
IX) Government will establish advice bureaux for small-scale mining operators in all
the provinces.
7.4 National SSM Development Framework
In order to achieve the objectives of establishing enabling conditions for SSM development
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and the objective of alleviating the constraint of accessing mineral rights, technical and
financial constrains, as stated in the policy proposals a framework has been developed.
This structure is composed of two main components, which are the National Steering
Committee of Service Providers to the SSM sector (NSC) and the Regional SSM
Committees.
7.4.1 The National Steering Committee of Service Providers to the SSM Sector
In order to streamline the institutional support required to assist the aspirant SSM projects
through the pre-feasibility stages of the project, the NSC will be established. The NSC
comprises:
Department of Minerals and Energy (beraux for SSM)
Council for Geoscience
CSIR Miningtek
Minerals and Energy Policy Centre (MEPC)
Khula Enterprise Promotion
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)
Various working groups within the NSC which are tasked with establishing systems and
procedures on key aspects of SSM promotion will be set up. The groups will co-ordinate
their activities with the Regional SSM Committees, whose duties are to co-ordinate
activities in provinces.
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7.4.1.1 The Mineral Rights Sub-committee
The duties of this committee will be:
i) to assist SSM companies who have lodged applications, to have
access to information on and to both private and state mineral rights;
ii) To identify mineral rights available for SSM in general;
iii) To obtain information from the regional SSM Committees through
Mine Economics Directorate of the Department of Minerals and
Energy on SSM companies' application for mineral rights and
assistance;
iv) To feed the one-stop-shop input from companies, regional SSM
Committees, and national government offices for the brochure on
mineral rights issues in the provinces.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
The proposed mineral rights policy is outlined more or less as intents in order to avoid the
likelihood of the policy being 'tied down' to specifics that could change for different
situations. Hence, a general policy has been adopted. It is vital to note that the
government's white paper on mineral rights has now been completed. Its contents resemble
those of the green paper on mineral rights and the objectives of the intended legislation are:
to 'prevent the hoarding of mineral rights and sterilisation of mineral resources'; the
redistribution of mineral rights and the alleviation of the devastating social costs of the
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downscaling process. Although it is almost impossible to quantify the jobs to be created by
the SSM sector, it is certain than the "ector can not be the only solution to the problems of
downscaling.
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APPENDIX I
A Summary of Mineral Right Development in Southern Africa
1462 The Court of Holland directs that Roman Law be appliea in certain respects resulting
in Roman-Dutch law.
1813 The Cradock Proclamation restricts mines of precious metal and stone as the property
of the crown in the Cape Colony.
1871 The Zuid Afrikanse Republic (ZAR) Gold Act 1 reserves the right of mining for all
precious metals and stones to the state.
1881 ZAR Resolution permits the separation of land and mineral rights.
1883 Adolf Luderitz acquires Angra Pequena and hinterland.
1885 Adolf Luderitz sold his mineral rights to Deutche Kolonial Gesellschaft fuer
Suedwest Africa (DKG) which included all mineral rights.
1888 DKG granted further mineral rights and opened its own Mines Department.
1889 DKG collapsed and all its rights were taken over by the German Reich who assumed
government of the area. All mineral rights were thus vested in the state.
1889 The British South African Company (BSA Company) was formed with rights to all
minerals north of the Limpopo river.
1891 The BSA Company's charter extended north of Zambczi river to North East and
North West Rhodesia with all mineral rights.
1891 British Central African Protectorate (Nyasaland) declared. BSA Company obtains
right to all minerals.
1894 Vast concessions granted for mineral rights in South West Africa.
1905 BSA Company granted mineral rights of Tuli, Lobatsi and Gaberone blocks.
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1933 Southern Rhodesia purchases all mineral rights from the BSA Company.
1956 AIl mineral rights of BSA Company transferred to Northern Rhodesia.
1963 All rights to minerals in the Crown Lands vested in the Ngwenyama in trust for the
Swazi nation.
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APPENDIX II
II Historical Evolution of Mineral Rights in Southern Africa
Levin and Handley (1993) in their discussion on mineral rights evolution of Southern
Africa outlined the past and current mineral rights systems in nine Southern African
countries, i.e. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
1Angola
All minerals, including oil and gas, on land and extending to the continental shelf, are
vested in the state. Prospecting and mining is subject to negotiation with authorities and
fees and time limits apply to all contracts.
2 Botswana
In 1890 Bechuanaland was used as a springboard for the colonisation of central Africa,
Rhodes's pioneer column mustered in the Protectorate prior to their final advance to
Salisbury. In 1904 the Tuli, Gaberone and Lobatsi blocks ceded by Chiefs for a railway,
were declared to be Crown land and in 1905 were finally granted to the British South
African Company (BSA Company).
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Mineral rights On these blocks, i.e, the Railway Strip via Lobatsi, Gaberone and Tuli are
held by the State. Other mineral rights arranged with Chiefs include the Ghanzi Block,
Molopo Farms and others all of which have reverted to the state. Mineral rights in the
Tribal Territories were regarded as the property of the Chief though since 1972 all rights
have been appropriated by the Central Government. All mineral rights in Botswana are
vested in the state.
3 Malawi
In 1891 Britain declared a formal protectorate over the country which was called British
Central African Protectorate. Johnston, the commissioner to the Protectorate co-operated
with Rhodes to administer what was later to become North Eastern Rhodesia on behalf of
the BSA Company, the company which initially held all mineral rights. According to Levin
and Handley (1993) these mineral rights appear to have been relinquished over the years
without any compensation being paid out.
The ownership of all mines, minerals, mineral oil or natural gas, other than any interest in
earth, sand, granite, marble, stone, limestone or other similar substance, ownership or other
disposition upon or under the land Orwater of Malawi is in perpetuity in the President on
behalf of the people of Malawi.
4 Mozambique
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Like Angola mineral rights are vested in th,~ state. Application to prospect or mine is
directed to the relevant authority.
5 Namibia
For most of the 19th century Namibia (South West Africa pnor to inr .:' ''::' ".', was
under the rule of independent tribes. As far back as 1868 German mis,
to interest Germany in the territory. In May 1883 Adolf Luderitz entered j'
with Joseph Fredricks of the Bethanians to acquire the whole coastline 1.
Pequena to the Orange river, to a width of 20 geographic miles (equivalent to 148.27 km,
was latter effected.
In 1884 Luderitz and his acquisition were placed under the protection of the Reich. By the
end of 1885 Luderitz had sold his rights to the Deutche Kolonial Gesellschaft fuer
Suedwest Africa (DKG). These rights included mineral rights. After acquiring a great deal
of mineral rights through treaties with various tribes the DKG in 1888 formed its own
Department of Mines which was officially recognised by the Reich Government who
granted the company sole prospecting rights throughout the territory to precious metals and
precious stones. Upon the collapse of the DKG in 1889 the German Reich took over the
running of the country resulting in all mineral rights being vested in the state.
In 1990 Namibia gained its independence. No changes on ownership ( f mineral rights has
taken place and none has been incorporated in the Minerals Ac.U3 of 1992...,
6 Zambia
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In 1924 Northern Rhodesia became all Imperial Protectorate administered by a governor
appointed from London and responsible for the Colonial Office, The BSA Company held
the mineral rights and Anglo American and Rhodesian Selection Trust were given grants
for extended exploration progiommes to assess the mineral potential of Northern Rhodesia.
This resulted in the discovery of a large rich Copper Belt.
Upon attaining independence in 1\)63 all mineral rights reverted to the state. Mines,
however, could have an element of private ownership in them subject to negotiation with
the state. Today Zambia is in the process of re-inventing the private companies to buy
some. of the mines in which the Government is the majority shareholder.
7 Zimbabwe
In 1890 the BSA Company occupied Southern 'Rhodesia. Mineral rights were vested in the
BSA Company until 1933 when they were bought by the Southern Rhodesian Goven.ment
for two million pounds sterling. Since that time all title to land in Zimbabwe hns been and
still is held subject to reservation of the mineral rights in favour of the state.
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